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Selection, Use, and Pay of an Economist in
an Antitrust Case
STEPHEN E. NAGIN*
In this practice-oriented article the author examines the
use of economic experts in antitrust cases. He analyzes several
factors that influence the selection of an economist such as the
various schools of economic theory related to antitrust, the
time commitments counsel can expect to receive from an ex-
pert, the demands of the case, and costs. The article reviews
several kinds of payment agreements and recommends which to
choose, based on the individual case. The author explains ways
to use the economist from before the filing of a complaint
through cross-examination of the adversary's expert. Also ex-
amining counsel's preparation of the expert, the author con-
cludes with explanations of how to use or reject the informa-
tion furnished by the expert, and how counsel should exercise
control over an antitrust case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, antitrust cases involving allegations
other than per se offenses' have increasingly made use of sophisti-
* Mr. Nagin is a partner with Rodman & Nagin of Miami, Florida. He was formerly
with the Federal Trade Commission. The author gratefully acknowledges criticism by for-
mer colleagues on the staff of the Commission, especially that of Steven Salop and Richard
Malatt. In addition, the author is thankful for the comments of Michael Klein, Douglas
Greer, Ralph Jonas, and Lisa Stark. These people, of course, bear no responsibility for any
faults that may remain.
1. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), Justice Black explained
that per se offenses are "certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
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cated, expert economic testimony.2 The reasons are several. Since
economics is at the heart of most antitrust cases, judges and ad-
ministrative hearing officers are increasingly unsympathetic to ef-
forts by counsel to offer formalistic pleadings and motions as an
alternative to an articulate, lucid analysis of the motives and con-
sequences of the economic behavior at issue. To meet the trial test
of a "rule of reason" analysis,s which courts use to evaluate con-
duct that may have an adverse impact upon competition, counsel
must have a thorough grasp of the economic implications and
probable competitive effects of any business behavior in question.
Therefore, it is important for counsel to consider as early as the
initial pleading stage whether or not the advice and subsequent
testimony of an economist will aid his client's cause.4
This is not to say that counsel should unduly rely on an expert
unreasonable and therefore illegal." The Court declared those practices illegal without any
inquiry into whether the defendant's actions were reasonable under the circumstances of the
case. Examples of per se violations are agreements between competitors to fix prices or to
allocate territories in order to minimize competition.
2. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE (1976); Holcombe & Mein-
ers, The Use of Economic Analysis in Law, 41 ALA. LAW. 222 (1980); O'Hara, The Economic
Expert in the Antitrust Arena, 12 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. No. 2 at 17 (1980).
3. Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether to prohibit a restrictive practice as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Expressing the
view that this rule fails to provide business with adequate behavioral guidelines, Mr. Justice
Marshall in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609, n.10 (1972), implored
that:
[w]ithout the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them in
predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal
under the Sherman Act. Should Congress ultimately determine that predictabil-
ity is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per se rules
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the
wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach.
Nonetheless, the Burger Court's opinion in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977), reintroduced a rule of reason approach to nonprice, vertical restraint cases
and signaled a disinclination to use per se rules except in cases involving clearly pernicious
acts or practices. See generally ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 864, at A-7
(1978). Although it is true that economic evidence has assumed increased importance in
recent rule of reason "conduct" cases (e.g., those involving exclusionary, predatory, or facili-
tating practices), the antitrust "structure" cases (e.g., those involving mergers, acquisitions
and joint ventures) are traditionally considered the ones most heavily weighted with eco-
nomic theory. The comments in this article apply equally to both kinds of cases.
4. Sometimes the failure to introduce economic evidence has disastrous consequences.
Thus, the "complete lack of pro-Commission [economic] expert testimony" resulted in the
reversal of an FTC decision when the Ninth Circuit could not find adequate proof of an
anticompetitive effect, which would have allowed the court to uphold the Commission's rul-
ing that a delivered pricing system for southern plywood was illegal. Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,323 at 75,668 (9th Cir. 1980).
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at the early stages of a case. Nor is it realistic to assume that there
are no other means to obtain some working understanding of the
economic issues in, and perspectives of, an antitrust case. Counsel
can obtain a basic appreciation of the economic issues germane to
a particular antitrust case by reading relevant decisions, particu-
larly those in which economic analysis provides the ratio
decidendi. In addition, counsel can consult any of a reasonably
wide range of specialized periodicalsO and textbooks7 dealing with
antitrust economics, available in most law libraries. These sources
of information, however, rarely do more than identify the types of
economic evidence that may be relevant. They provide a starting
point for deciding whether to resort to a consulting economist or a
forensic expert witness.8
Unfortunately, periodicals and textbooks are silent on the cen-
tral practical problems: locating,9 interviewing, retaining, and using
an appropriate economic consultant or forensic expert.10 These
5. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 481
F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
6. The American Economics Association publishes an Index of Economic Journals that
lists all major periodicals on antitrust economics. Among the most prestigious are: American
Economic Review, Bell Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics,
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of
Economic Theory, Journal of Law & Economics, Review of Economic Studies, and the
Southern Economic Journal. Other valuable references include: Antitrust Bulletin, Anti-
trust Law & Economics Review, Industrial Economic Review, and Journal of Reprints for
Antitrust Law and Economics.
7. Four of the better textbooks are D. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1980), J. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES (2d ed. 1980), D. NEEDHAM,
THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1978), and F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980). These
texts survey the field less technically than articles in the economics journals, and they pro-
vide references to economists who are experts in specific areas most relevant to a lawyer's
needs.
8. The term "consulting economist" describes an expert who will assist in pretrial and
help counsel select and prepare a forensic expert to testify. See note 34 and accompanying
text infra. For an interesting discussion with many personal observations by a distinguished
forensic economist about his appointment, responsibilities, fees, and assignments when serv-
ing as an expert witness in a merger case, see Bachman, New Role for Economists - The
United States Lines Case, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 797 (1978).
9. The most prevalent means of locating potential consulting or forensic economists is
word-of-mouth reference by other economists and attorneys. Counsel can check on the basic
credentials of suggested economists by using the biographical listing of members of the
American Economic Association in 68 AMER. ECON. REv. No. 6 at 37 (1978).
10. For a sample direct and cross-examination of an economist, the reader may find
helpful the ABA's Section of Antitrust Law reprint of the transcript from the National In-
stitute on the Trial of an Antitrust Case in 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 184-211 (1977). Also en-
lightening is the economic testimony from Golden Grain Macaroni Company, 78 F.T.C. 63
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practical problems cause altogether too many counsel to delay or
avoid retaining an economist despite the inherent importance of
such assistance.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ECONOMIC EXPERT IN ANTITRUST
CASES
Among the most important aspects of an economist's assis-
tance in handling an antitrust case is his11 ability to analyze and
communicate the effects of certain economic behaviors. For exam-
ple, in an attempt-to-monopolize case brought under section 2 of
the Sherman Act,1 2 an economic expert can explain how superfi-
cially benign conduct actually could be very harmful. Conversely,
he can explain why practices that seem harsh, if not predatory,
might be unobjectionable. The analysis necessary to determine
whether such conduct is pernicious or benign usually includes a
consideration of factors most trial lawyers are ill-equipped to pur-
sue, such as a history of how the industry developed. It is routine,
however, for an economist to research and analyze the structure of
the industry, including such factors as a definition of the market,
the number of firms within that market, their market shares, the
sizes and size distribution of the firms, the barriers or impediments
to entry, and the importance of patents or technology. He can pro-
vide an analysis of the traditional conduct of firms in that indus-
try, such as their pricing and advertising practices. His analysis
should also include the relevant criteria of performance of firms in
the industry, such as each firm's return on investment, and its ra-
tio of sales to assets. An economist should understand the competi-
tive processes that underlie strategic interactions among firms and
be able to distinguish between different types of economic behav-
ior to ascertain which conduct causes real injury to competition
and which does not. When contemplating litigation strategy, an
economist should help develop the theory of the case based on a
competition analysis that is consistent, logical, simple, and, most
importantly, invulnerable to successful attack by an opposing
expert. 13
(1971), abridged and reprinted in Scanlon, Economics in the Courtroom: The "Technology"
of Antitrust Litigation, 3 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REv. 43, 54 (1969).
11. Throughout this article economists and counsel occasionally are referred to as "he"
or "his" for sake of simplicity in writing.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
13. Of course, such advice is valuable not only in litigation, it is also a useful aid in
counseling.
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It is in litigation, however, that an economist offers the most
valuable contribution." Economic expertise lends itself to evaluat-
ing the potential bases for claims, designing and analyzing discov-
ery, providing a focus on the important issues, preparing exhibits
for trial, calculating damages, testifying at trial, and if necessary,
assisting on appeal.
III. EARLY RETENTION OF AN EXPERT
An economist experienced in antitrust trials may play an im-
portant role in shaping the prosecution or defense strategy.18
Counsel should engage the expert before filing a complaint or an-
swer, to enable the lawyer to narrow his focus at an early stage,
and thus cut discovery time and expense. Early retention "permits
the economist to help shape the theory of the complaint or answer,
and. . . to suggest avenues for discovery."' 6 Moreover, if the econ-
omist thoroughly studies the case, counsel can develop his testi-
mony without resort to cumbersome factual hypotheticals."'
Despite these reasons for early retention, some lawyers delay
engaging an expert. In addition to the practical problems of locat-
ing, interviewing, and retaining an economist, some seasoned trial
lawyers feel uncomfortable about sharing litigation strategy with a
non-lawyer-perhaps because of liberal discovery permitted under
rules of civil procedure,'5 or because of their desire not to share
control of the case. Other trial lawyers fear the high cost of an ex-
pert witness. Although cost may significantly limit the use of an
expert in discovery and preparation for trial, able trial counsel in-
creasingly decide to engage primary and backup economic experts
on major issues. These trial lawyers address the potential problems
caused by early retention by winnowing out their "excess" use of
experts as the issues narrow. Accordingly, although cost may deter-
mine which expert to choose and how extensively to rely on him,
14. See generally Delong, The Role, If Any, of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. - (1980).
15. See Stelzer, The Role of the Economic Expert in Antitrust Litigation (address
before the Antitrust Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, Feb. 14, 1979)
(available as a reprint from N.E.R.A., 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
16. Jentes, Defining the Role of the Economist-A Lawyer's Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1838, 1839 (1979).
17. This is not to say that hypothetical questions are without value in complex litiga-
tion. They do afford counsel an opportunity to sum up in the middle of a case and they may
help simplify, for the jury, the nature of competitive relationships and their effects.
18. See Connors, A New Look at an Old Concern-Protecting Expert Information
from Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 271 (1980).
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counsel should bring an expert into the case at the earliest
opportunity.
IV. DECIDING WHO SHOULD HANDLE THE EXPERT WITNESS
Large, complicated antitrust cases usually require a trial team.
For several reasons, the team member who primarily deals with the
expert economists and coordinates the information should be the
second or third in command.
First, the time required for dealing with the expert can unduly
distract lead counsel. The economic expert does not limit his testi-
mony to specific industry events, nor to a particular firm's conduct.
He must place strategic interaction and the effects of events in the
perspective of industrywide structure, conduct, and performance.
He needs considerable time to amass and assess this information,
and to develop a testimonial approach that places it in proper per-
spective. Although lead counsel must work with the expert to de-
rive the maximum benefit from this expertise, he is unlikely to
have the time required to oversee this process properly.
Second, the lead counsel must not get too bogged down in one
part of a complex case. He must maintain an overview, to provide
general guidance as well as "fine tuning" questions for the expert.
Staying a step removed is essential to control of a complex case.
Yet the expert is much too important to relegate to too junior
a counsel. An intermediate member of the team, perhaps the num-
ber two or number three attorney should have the experience to
handle such a crucial but time-consuming witness. Moreover, the
lawyer assigned to handle the expert must be able to grasp the full
importance of the other testimony offered during the trial. He
must keep the forensic economist abreast of the case as the trial
unfolds-unless an economic consultant charged with that respon-
sibility sits through the entire trial.
Finally, besides the need for objectivity and distance between
the lead counsel and the expert, cost to the client offers another
reason for shifting responsibility to the next in command. Presum-
ably, lead counsel receives a higher rate of pay than others on the
case. Given the time ordinarily required to develop the expert's ec-
onomic testimony most effectively, the savings in dollars derived
from a lower hourly rate could be considerable.
V. SELECTING THE PROPER ECONOMIST FOR LITIGATION
Since not all economists know how to evaluate economic evi-
[Vol. 35:255
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dence, and since good economists are expensive and engaged in
other pursuits as well, the selection of an economic expert is not
simple. Four factors tend to control the selection process: 1) philo-
sophic bias, 2) time, 3) personality, and 4) cost.
The branch of the "dismal science" that most directly deals
with antitrust issues is industrial organization economics. Indus-
trial organization economics (1.0.) is a distinct microeconomic spe-
cialty that examines the implications of alternative market struc-
ture and the effects of single firm behavior or multifirm interaction
on competitive performance in the marketplace.1 9 There are three
main schools of thought or philosophical bias within 1.0. One of
these is variously called the "New Learning" or "New Thinking"
or "Chicago School," although by no means do its proponents work
in just one academic location. The Chicago School economists ar-
gue that antimonopoly action should focus on cartels and horizon-
tal mergers, not on the actions of individual firms.' 0 Individual
firms cannot obtain monopoly power unless they collude with
others. 1 Various business practices by individual firms, such as
tie-in sales and advertising, are procompetitive, not anticompeti-
tive, as economists once thought." The "Harvard School" disputes
this view. The Harvard School argues that individual firms can
create monopoly power without colluding with others.'" Attention
should focus on dynamic elements in competition, such as time
lags and innovation, as well as the role of information, transaction,
and control costs.' 4 Members of the Harvard School also present
arguments about the relationships between firm size and efficiency
and between firm size and the concentration of power.' 5 A third
group of economists called the "New School" take a different ap-
proach. Members of the New School do not condemn a questioned
business practice as anticompetitive per se. Instead, they describe
19. See generally Mueller, Lawyer's Guide to the Economic Literature on Competition
and Monopoly: An Introduction to the Doctoral Dissertations (pts. 1-3), 5 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REv. No. 4 at 83 (1972); 6 id. No. 1 at 67, No. 2 at 83 (1973).
20. See INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING (Goldschmid, Mann, & Wes-




23. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 952 (1979).
24. Id. at 951, 952.
25. See Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979);
Schwartz, Justice and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, id. at 1076. See also Muel-
ler, Lawyer's Guide to the Welfare-Loss Concept: An Introduction, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REv. No. 3 at 75 (1972); Nagin, Book Review, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 545 (1977).
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the conditions under which the practice becomes anticompetitive
and those under which it becomes procompetitive."6
Obviously, selection of the economist chosen by counsel will
depend upon the type of case he has. 7 One important factor is the
philosophic bias of the expert. For example, if the client is a small
franchisee suing a large franchisor for a traditional exculsionary
practice,18 a Chicago School economist would probably be unsup-
portive. If, however, the case involves defending a large manufac-
turer against allegations of sales below cost, the attorney should
probably seek a Chicago School economist. In this situation a
Harvard School economist would likely subscribe to a long-run, dy-
namic test, but his Chicago School counterpart would probably
prefer using a short-run, static test to evaluate the conduct."
The second major factor in selecting an economist is the
amount of time he is prepared to spend on the case. Consultants or
witnesses fall into three general categories of experience and likely
time constraints. The first is eminent experts (either commercial
consultants or academicians), with impressive credentials and in-
tellectual clout. Unfortunately, such experts who do commercial
consulting cost a good deals' while academicians' other pressing re-
sponsibilities will preclude total immersion in a case except during
semester breaks and in the summer. The second general category
of economists comprises those new to their field. Usually, they are
very interested in becoming more eminent, but they may gain their
expertise at the client's expense. A third and sizeable category are
26. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 23, at 950-51.
27. A special situation arises when selection of an expert is based on offensive foreclo-
sure of expertise and concealment of data to other parties in multi-party litigation. In such
a case, counsel summarily seeks to preclude an expert previously retained by a party no
longer involved in the litigation from providing advice to another party involved in the liti-
gation. See A Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(b)(4)(B): The Expert Twice Retained, 12
U. MicH. J.L. REF. 533 (1979).
28. I.e., the franchisor might tie the sale of its product A to purchase of its less desira-
ble products B, C and D.
29. See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89
YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard For Predatory
Practices, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1979) (discussion of "static" versus "dynamic" tests in
discerning evidence of predatory pricing). See also ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 968, at A-4 (1980) FTC Conference on Strategic Predation and Antitrust Analysis (ex-
cellent New School analysis).
30. Professional consulting economists can give undivided attention to a client's case
and may be of greater aid to a less experienced lawyer, although greater overhead and
higher profit expectations tend to make them expensive. A drawback, perhaps, is that a
"pro" may lack that thin veil of objectivity provided by academic robes and may seem to
the jury too much like a "hired gun."
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experienced but not yet eminent experts-generally able and con-
scientious, though not yet revered by their peers.
Counsel probably should not select an economist from the first
category-the most eminent thinker or prolific writer-if the case
will require hundreds of hours of input by the expert for effective
advice and mastery of the facts. If the focus is on interpretation of
readily available and relatively simple facts, then someone from
the second category-an economist new to his field-will suffice,
although an expert from the third category-an experienced but
not yet eminent expert-is best and would more probably provide
the needed assistance.
81
One should note that the trend is to have two kinds of 1.0.
economists on an antitrust case. Concern both about the eminent
experts' lack of available time and the constraints imposed by lib-
eral discovery rules has prompted 'some trial lawyers to adopt a
staffing practice similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission"
or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.88 Both the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission econo-
mists help develop theories, assist in designing and analyzing dis-
covery, and then help select and prepare a forensic economist, typ-
ically an academician, to serve as the expert at trial. If the in-
house economist is conscientious though unheralded, he may help
retain an eminent academician to present the economic evidence
from the witness stand.
4
Allied to the expert's expected commitment of time is his level
of energy. If the expert must prepare lengthy testimony, stamina is
important. An economic expert must be able to withstand long
hours during tense days, weeks, or months of trial. Therefore,
counsel must determine at the outset whether the expert can hold
up under the strain of trial.
The third major factor in selecting an economist is his person-
ality-a key element in the psychology of persuasion. The expert
31. Although most 1.0. economists are capable generalists, some have specialized exper-
tise such as mergers or cartels. Also, some are industry specialists, expert in industries such
as gasoline retailing, food manufacturing, automobiles, or energy.
32. The Federal Trade Commission has a Bureau of Economics, Division of Economic
Evidence.
33. The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has an Economic Policy Office.
34. See, e.g., Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., The Economist as Expert Witness,
Nzws & PaasprxCTiS (Fall 1979). (Robert R. Nathan Assoc., Inc. is located in Washington,
D.C.) Just outside the field of 1.0. are countless professors of business administration who
are familiar with 1.0. techniques and issues. Many are also expert in certain industries and
can testify about a definition of the relevant market, which does not require a close acquain-
tance with antitrust economics.
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must persuade the trier of fact to accept the logic of his views and
their practical and compelling quality. Thus, he must exude a
sense of confidence and create empathy. He must be absolutely
convincing and seem completely sincere.35 Generally, an economic
expert who testifies frequently in antitrust cases has learned by
experience and has mastered these elements of persuasion and the
subtleties of courtroom presentation. An eager economic expert
who is a novice in the courtroom, even if equally knowledgeable
about the subject matter, is less likely to prove effective (and may
not appreciate the need to accept the role of a team player during
trial preparation).
Even if the forensic economist recognizes the need to become
an integral member of counsel's litigation team, his patina of wis-
dom and experience acquired in numerous courtroom jousts may
have potential drawbacks. A savvy expert with remarkable court-
room credentials could have a background full of annoying witness
habits that are difficult to break, become bored by lengthy prepa-
rations for testifying, or be cynical about the entire legal process.
In addition, his own recorded contrary opinions of long standing
may inhibit his testimony.86 The trier of fact will perceive the ex-
pert's annoying habits and cynicism as easily as his candor, hon-
esty, and sincerity. Counsel must consider the persuasiveness of
the expert, therefore, along with his philosophic bias, the time he
can spend on the case, and his energy level.
Counsel should explore these factors in the initial consultation
with the potential expert, and ask the proposed expert what law
firms he has worked with in the past. Later, counsel should ask the
law firms that have worked with the prospective witness for infor-
mation concerning his philosophic bias, energy level, in-court man-
ner, ability to explain and persuade, and the time he devoted to
prior assignments. Counsel should find out whether the expert was
the only economist who testified, and if he had alerted counsel to
probable defenses and cross-examination strategy. Finally, counsel
should ask whether the firm would hire him again and request a
35. The eminent 1.0. experts are in demand not merely for their knowledge of economic
concepts and courtroom technique, but also for their ability to present even the most ob-
truse theory in a thorough yet understandable manner. They persuade not by bluster and
semantics, but by simplicity, conciseness, and emphatic presentation.
36. Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 702-06 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence govern the extent of avoiding exposure of an expert's contrary opin-
ions. See also J. WEINSTEIN, 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE §§ 702-06 (1975). Engaging a consult-
ing economist along with a forensic economist minimizes exposure to discovery. See Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 466 F. Supp. 1088 (D.D.C. 1978).
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copy of prior testimony and any accompanying exhibits to enable
review for potentially conflicting opinions.
VI. PREPARING QUESTIONS FOR AN ECONOMIC EXPERT
Counsel must be able to adjust to the expert's personality and
the idiosyncratic demands of the case. Although no single approach
is always effective, three techniques generally seem successful: the
simple checklist, an index of key points, and a complete script of
certain anticipated questions and answers.
At the beginning of a case, a forensic expert witness may use-
fully suggest a list of topics that counsel then should outline . 7
Such an outline comprises the gist of the expert's likely testimony,
organized to coordinate it with his narrative. Thereafter, counsel
should keep the outline up to date, with the expert's advice, as
discovery progresses. This outline serves as the guide for the subse-
quent courtroom checklist.
Complex litigation requires the expert to cover a broad area.
Thus, a simple checklist may be inadequate at the start of an ex-
pert's testimony. Once the expert has narrowed his testimony,
however, a simple checklist or an equivalent device is necessary for
that testimony to proceed fluidly. One other such technique uses
an index of key points with each point supplemented by possibly
dozens of questions. Counsel should list each question separately
on a five-by-eight inch file card keyed to the index,88 then revise
the index as questions are added, revised, deleted, or changed in
sequence. Counsel should rehearse these questions with the foren-
sic economist until the economist feels comfortable with each ques-
tion and counsel feels comfortable with each answer. At trial, an-
other attorney on the team checks off the testimony elicited from
the expert against the index of key points.
A third technique is the complete script of questions and an-
ticipated answers. Prepared questions, although allowing for the
benefits of clarity, do have drawbacks. An over prepared expert
may appear less spontaneous in the courtroom. An expert over-
trained on sequence creates the risk that a question asked out of
sequence will generate confusion. This confusion can occur if, as is
not unusual, the judge interjects questions that overlap with or su-
37. Counsel should keep to a minimum any written information transmitted to or from
a forensic expert witness. This will limit discovery under FED. R. EVID. 612 and FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4).
38. Three-by-five-inch index cards are too small to accommodate both the question and
the narrative gist of a desired answer.
1981]
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persede counsel's. Confusion also arises if anticipated questions get
asked by opposing counsel on voir dire. And, of course, counsel at
times may get sidetracked, asking less than all of the planned
questions, and electing to skip around to complete the missed
points. Further, a prepared list places counsel at a disadvantage
when it becomes necessary to lead the expert through a difficult
area if he falters under the pressure of the witness stand. Finally, a
witness used to answering prepared questions may suffer when
subjected to aggressive cross-examination unless first put through
a mock cross-examination.
Counsel can minimize these drawbacks and still secure the
benefits of clarity that prepared questions offer, through two prac-
tices. First, the expert should not reduce his answers to verbatim
formulations. The script should reflect only the gist of the desired
answer. This facilitates the use of spontaneous backup questions to
round out each point. It also generates nondiscoverable work prod-
uct-which may be a key consideration for federal government
counsel, under the Jencks Act." Second, counsel should avoid re-
hearsing the questions in identical order. He should develop recog-
nizable cues and build them into each question. If he does this, the
answers should not vary significantly, even if the sequence of the
questions changes. Slight changes in emphasis or additional anec-
dotal pieces will keep the material fresh and the expert alert.
VII. AREAS TO COVER IN PREPARING AN EXPERT TO TESTIFY
After selecting the forensic expert, determining his scope of
work, and establishing his fee basis, counsel must prepare for the
testimony itself. Direct examination must cover the expert's quali-
fications to give an expert opinion, a definition of the procedures
he followed or of the matter to be explained, a demonstration that
the expert's testimony is credible and trustworthy, the ultimate
opinion itself, and an explanation of that opinion.'
The forensic expert must be advised that counsel will cover
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Jencks rule, which applies to federal criminal cases
and civil administrative proceedings, permits defense counsel to inspect certain prior state-
ments of government witnesses before cross-examination. See generally Jencks to the Agen-
cies! 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 807 (1979).
40. Under FED. R. EVID. 705, counsel need not give notice of the expert's basis for
reaching his conclusions on direct examination. Failure to cover the basis, however, may
weaken his opinion. If counsel is setting a trap to get the cross-examiner to inquire into it
and his opponent does not take the bait, but instead qualifies his own expert who testifies
forcefully and in complete detail, the gambit may backfire.
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these five steps in this order. The expert must know, as far as pos-
sible, the precise verbal route counsel intends to follow. In addi-
tion, counsel who will conduct the examination should give practi-
cal pointers on the art of testifying on direct and on cross-
examination. But counsel should take into account the expert's
previous experience. An expert of long experience in the courtroom
may resent being preached at too much.
The first matter to establish in the expert's testimony is the
need for an expert opinion.1 Presumably, counsel will have given
notice by listing the expert on the witness list with his area of tes-
timony mentioned in the trial brief. Thus, if opposing counsel
raises the objection that there is no need for expertise on the sub-
ject, counsel can counter with the dual response that: 1) the econo-
mist will enlighten the finder of fact on a subject that involves spe-
cial, advanced knowledge; and 2) many weeks or months of notice
have been given without timely objection.
In presenting the expert's qualifications, counsel should be-
ware of the opposing counsel's suggestion to "put [only] his curric-
ulum vita in the record." Opposing counsel will urge that there is
no need to spend precious time expounding on the acknowledged
expert's noble qualifications. The premise is that the vita will be in
the record if anyone doubts his credentials. But the premise con-
ceals a trap. Juries (and judges) are impressed with effective oral
exposition of an expert's qualifications such as doctorates earned,
articles written, and positions held. They may not appreciate or
understand the highlights buried in a long, written resume. The
expert will be more persuasive if he establishes his qualifications
through oral testimony, even if counsel must condense his ques-
tions on the matter. One way to counter the vita-in-the-record ploy
is to solicit an agreement from opposing counsel that the econo-
mist is an expert, and ask, through the judge: "Does opposing
counsel also agree with this expert's opinion?" If such an agree-
ment is absent, then counsel should insist on the right to establish
credibility as well as expertise, through careful inquiry that devel-
ops the expert's credentials.
Among the preliminary matters counsel should consider is the
phrasing of the ultimate opinion question. For example, counsel
may ask: "Do you have an opinion to a degree of economic cer-
41. To establish need for expert economic testimony in an antitrust case counsel can
stress the difficulty in evaluating the existence or effect of various structural, behavioral,
and performance factors. See Fxn. R. EvID. 702 (Testimony by Experts).
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tainty as an industrial organization economist about (say, what ef-
fect defendant's conduct will have in the relevant market)?" This
demonstrates that the testimony sought transcends mere lay opin-
ion. But care is essential. Questions designed to elicit answers that
will serve as the legal building blocks for a central theory should be
phrased to avoid unduly obtuse legalities. Therefore, counsel
should not ask: "With respect to the issue of like grade and quali-
ty, do you have an opinion . . .?" Instead, he should inquire:
"Turning your attention to defendant's products, do you have an
opinion about how they compare to the plaintiff's products?" Fur-
ther, if counsel uses hypothetical questions they should be simple
enough for the trier of fact to understand, yet sufficiently compre-
hensive to be relevant to the case. Because there is a significant
tradeoff between these qualities, counsel should favor simplicity
and let opposing counsel appear to be adding complexity in cross-
examination.
Enlivening the expert's direct examination aids its persuasive-
ness. Thus, putting before the jury such demonstrative evidence as
a prepared chart that graphically presents the steps or procedures
the expert followed in arriving at his opinion helps the jury to un-
derstand the expert's testimony. There is a simple litany to use
when offering demonstrative evidence. It consists of three ques-
tions: "Have you prepared any charts in connection with your tes-
timony today?" "Are those charts a fair and accurate representa-
tion of how you arrived at your opinion?" "Would it assist you in
explaining your opinion to the jury if you could refer to your
charts?" Counsel then requests permission to publish the exhibits
to the jury.
Crucial to trial preparation is consideration of the likely
course of cross-examination. The expert should know how to an-
swer all substantive questions as unconditionally and unambigu-
ously as possible. Counsel should advise the expert to be polite and
not hedge his answers, lest he seem biased and untrustworthy.
There should be practice sessions for stock cross-examination
questions. Typical cross-examination questions include: "Were you
paid to testify?" ("Yes, no expert works for free."); "How much
were you paid to testify?" ("Forty-thousand dollars, my expertise
is very valuable."); and "Did you discuss your testimony with
counsel?" ("Yes, just as all witnesses discuss their testimony with
counsel, including opposing counsel during deposition.")
Counsel should alert the expert to watch whenever counsel
starts to stand up during cross-examination, and to wait for an ob-
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jection and ruling before answering. The forensic ex-
pert-especially if an academician-should be reminded to confine
his answers to the exact questions asked. He should not be profes-
sorial in the courtroom. Furthermore, he should never answer a
question with a question, except when counsel does not object to
an unclear question. In such a situation, the witness should ask the
examiner to clarify what he means.
To respond to a broad, compound question, the witness may
need to break the question into its separate parts and answer it
step-by-step. Leading questions to which a simple "yes" or "no"l
would be misleading may require immediate explanation, espe-
cially if the examiner suggests an answer that omits facts, assumes
facts beyond the witness's knowledge, or contains implications only
partially true.
A witness interrupted in the middle of his answer by the cross-
examiner may need to request permission to finish his answer be-
cause counsel may not know whether the answer is complete. If the
cross-examiner estimates or suggests any ranges, times, amounts,
or percentages-as when varying or supplementing the facts of a
hypothetical question asked on direct examination-the expert
must not agree unless he would have arrived independently at the
same calculations. Even then, however, counsel should have in-
structed him to state that his answer assumes the cross-examiner's
estimates, which may not be exact.
Counsel should educate the expert to recognize certain stock
cross-examination techniques. Opposing counsel will search for a
"soft" spot and attempt to weaken the testimony by showing that
the expert made an assumption; other experts would or could
make different assumptions; the expert relied on this assumption
to arrive at his opinion; reliance on a different assumption would
have resulted in a different opinion; and that different opinion dif-
fers significantly from the expert's opinion. If opposing counsel re-
peatedly uses this line of examination in his cross-examination of
the expert, it may become apparent to the finder of fact that dif-
ferent opinions may be extrapolated from virtually the same data.
Another cross-examination technique is to show gaps in the
expert's procedures, such as what the expert did not take into ac-
count. In addition, opposing counsel may try to show inconsisten-
cies in the basis of the expert's assumptions as being liberal in
some areas and conservative in others. Furthermore, a good cross-
examiner will attempt to identify and belabor material inaccura-
cies in computations or conclusions.
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Therefore, counsel must take care not to permit the expert to
overstate his basis for an opinion on direct examination or to be
unduly defensive on cross-examination. An able opponent will
seize on any such overstatement or defensiveness. Counsel must
remember this when phrasing his thematic question so as to avoid
undermining the effectiveness of an otherwise sound opinion.
VIII. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AN OPPOSING ECONOMIC EXPERT
In conducting the cross-examination of an expert, counsel
must establish control over both the pace and the direction of the
questions and answers, thereby allowing the testimony to come
from himself. Counsel should ask leading questions that allow the
opponent's expert to say "yes" or "no," or "I agree" or "I disa-
gree." He should not permit any opening for the opposing expert
to "run with an answer."
An interim goal of cross-examination is to engage the expert in
a battle on counsel's terms and cause the opposing expert to worry
about the direction of counsel's questions. This may preoccupy the
expert and force him to answer questions outside his frame of ref-
erence. Since most economists are theoretically oriented, placing
the preoccupied expert in a real-world situation may underscore
his reliance on terminology and leave him sounding overly theoret-
ical. His opinion will then lose credibility. If, for example, the ex-
pert has used statistical data to arrive at his opinion, counsel
should ask questions implying that in truth, the witness has no
real knowledge of the market. "You never actually ran a petro-
chemical plant, did you, sir?" "In fact, you have never had to make
a payroll, have you?" Counsel should make sure, of course, that the
witness is testifying as an economist, not as a well-informed lay-
man, about the specific market being evaluated. 42 Cross-examina-
tion then should focus on the quality of the expert's preparation.
For example, did he fail to check key financial records of all firms
in the market? Counsel should seek to undermine any impression
42. Although FED. R. EVID. 701 allows an expert to testify in part as a lay witness, the
"reasonably relied upon" requirement of Rule 703 allows an "end run" around the hearsay
rule. For example, the expert may testify that he conducted a survey of suppliers or con-
sumers, that it is of the type customarily relied upon by economists, and that it shows XYZ.
Even though the survey was conducted after-the-fact, in anticipation of litigation, and
would not qualify for an exemption under Rule 803(17), it might be admitted under Rule
803(24) or 804(b)(5) and its results presented under Rule 703. On cross-examination, coun-
sel can effectively attack the expert's lack of first-hand knowledge, as well as the survey
results, by showing the witness relied on a survey of laymen and he is merely testifying as a
well-informed layman rather than as an expert on the industry.
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of the expert's thoroughness and otherwise seek to cut away at the
building blocks for his opinion.
Thus, the direct examination of an economist should establish
that the expert undertook and properly discharged an assignment
to study a specified subject for the case and, as a result of care and
wisdom, arrived at a sound opinion. The cross-examination of an
economist should show that the expert is unqualified, partial to the
adversary or philosophically biased, unthorough in preparation,
and purely theoretical in approach, with the consequence that his
opinions are intrinsically untrustworthy, although he may agree
with the cross-examiner on some critical points.
Finally, a cross-examiner must be tenacious. Counsel should
persist in a line of attack until he achieves the objective-even if
he must pursue the same point by a different sequence of ques-
tions later in the cross-examination. A good cross-examination de-
velops from something like a businessman's "decision-tree": coun-
sel should plot out what to ask regardless of the answers given.
Despite this need for tenacity, however, the cross-examination
should be as brief as possible. Counsel should elicit the facts
needed to prove a case or disprove an opponent's case, and deal
only with what is necessary to the credibility or opinion of the
expert.
IX. THE BEST WAY TO PAY AN ANTITRUST ECONOMIST
Because fee schedules vary, counsel should inquire at the out-
set about the amount of the expert's fees. A recent graduate may
charge as little as $300 a day, but a renowned expert who is a
courtroom veteran may charge in excess of $2,500 per day. Counsel
should ascertain past fee arrangements of the expert to establish a
bargaining range with him. The proper arrangement for each case
depends on factors such as the likelihood that the case will actually
be litigated, the simplicity or complexity of the matter, and the
expected length of the trial.
Four types of fee arrangements are common. The first is a
fixed daily rate for each full day or prescribed part of a day. The
expert presents bills at the conclusion of testimony, or possibly in
interim billings before and during trial. Because the lawyer usually
has limited ability to predict what expertise the case will demand,
an open-ended daily rate has obvious -drawbacks. -In the simple
case, however, it may be an appropriate fee arrangement.
A second form of fee arrangement is a fixed fee (plus reasona-
ble and necessary expenses), in which the expert and the lawyer
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agree on an estimate of the total amount of time necessary and the
appropriate fee for the expected services. If the time required is
seriously underestimated, however, the expert may be unhappy
with the fee and may adjust his efforts accordingly. Conversely, if
the time requirement is overestimated, the client will receive a
large bill that he may believe unwarranted. Nonetheless, in a case
with uncomplicated facts, limited application of economic theory,
and damages not difficult to estimate, the financial certainty of the
fixed fee arrangement may be desirable.
When counsel cannot accurately estimate how long he will
need the expert, a hybrid arrangement with a low daily rate and
fixed expenses, or a sliding-scale fee varying with such factors as
the number of hours spent and the complexity of the case may be
appropriate. One such hybrid arrangement would encourage a well-
known economist to take on an extensive assignment in San Fran-
cisco at a low weekly fee, but with his expenses paid and accommo-
dations provided at an exclusive Nob Hill hotel. In contrast, an
expert of somewhat lesser standing may receive a prestigious case
at half his customary rate in an effort to broaden his credentials. 8
When estimation of the expert's time is difficult, the goal should be
to arrive at a flexible arrangement that is equitable and avoids the
drawbacks inherent in a rigid daily rate or a fixed fee formula.
The fourth type of fee package, the contract with severable,
multiple parts, offers varying rates for different stages of the case.
During the initial phase the expert usually does little more than
identify relevant economic issues, suggest information sources, and
design an economic strategy or framework for litigation. Since this
contractually defined phase of the case merely provides both par-
ties a chance to evaluate the case and the economist's role, it
should be of short duration. Usually, counsel and the expert com-
plete these tasks within a week, and often in one or two days. The
parties should agree on the length of the period and establish a
daily rate-perhaps at a level equal to the expert's going rate in
previous cases.
The second part of the severable contract covers pretrial dis-
covery and trial preparation. When counsel cannot accurately pre-
dict the expert's time requirements, he should put performance in-
43. When applicable, counsel should attempt to persuade an economist, perhaps one
who already has the background knowledge on a given issue from an earlier case, that a less
expensive fee arrangement is appropriate because the expert can exploit that knowledge.
The savings to the client (whether public or private) could be considerable.
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dicators in the contract." These progress points identify and
evaluate the assistance of the expert. If either the lawyer or the
expert is dissatisfied with progress when reaching a performance
indicator-sometimes called a "deliverable" in government con-
tracts-counsel can alter his theory or pretrial strategy or even the
expert before financial or other exigencies preclude changes.
Charges for this phase may be accumulated on the basis of days,
weeks, or months with a fixed amount not to exceed a stipulated
figure. This rate should be less than the expert's usual daily rate,
given the greater certainty afforded the expert, and the fact that
he will receive a higher rate in the third stage of the trial.
The third part of the severable contract covers the actual tes-
timony of the expert in deposition or at trial. Because testifying
often produces more anxiety and stress than work under the other
phases of the contract, and the length of direct and cross-examina-
tion is uncertain, the rate is higher and the time left open-ended.
This higher rate also assuages the expert's concern with the earlier
discounted rate for services rendered in the second stage."5
The contract with severable, multiple parts offers the certainty
of the set daily-fee rate while minimizing some of its drawbacks.
The client will know his maximum financial exposure, the expert
will have a better estimate of the time and effort he must devote to
the case, and the lawyer will have more control of this costly part
of a complex case. Thus, the parties should use this fee arrange-
ment in complicated cases that involve protracted litigation.
X. WHAT TO EXPECT OF AN EXPERT
An 1.0. expert should focus on all reasonable economic detail"'
and yet realize that he is not preparing to write a treatise. The case
is not a testing ground for the economist's novel theories. Nonethe-
less, an antitrust case is expensive-very expensive."" One reason
44. A performance indicator is a tangible checkpoint to help the lawyer measure pro-
gress toward a goal. It can be a verbal or written report, survey, chart, or statistical compila-
tion, depending upon the type of case and the expert's assignment.
45. The contract may provide for a lump-sum bonus or payout during the second phase
in the event of settlement. This provision may preclude bias by the expert against settling
the case.
46. See Stelzer, Defining the Role of the Antitrust Economist-An Economist's Per-
spective, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1844, 1845-46 (1979).
47. "In the eyes of the public, decade-long antitrust litigation with years of pre-trial
discovery, months of trial, and years of appeals is a monument to economic waste and fee-
producing futility." Panel Discussion: Critical Evaluation of the Preparation and Trial of
Cases Involving Complex Economic Issues, 47 ANTrTRusT L.J. 851, 853 (1978) (statement of
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for this enormous expense-as well as the slow pace of complex
antitrust litigation-is counsel's failure to simplify issues and limit
discovery at the earliest practicable time. Economists, therefore,
should help counsel avoid unintended "pretrial litigation
manuevering.'4 An efficient expert should not look for data on mi-
nor issues when the outcome of the case depends on broader
topics.'
In summary, if counsel treats the expert like an integral mem-
ber of the litigation team, he will become a team player. He can
help draft or review discovery devices, prepare questions or suggest
topics for depositions, analyze discovery returns, review the adver-
sary expert's curriculum vita and analyze his relevant writings, at-
tend the deposition of the adversary's expert and analyze the tran-
script, and help to prepare the cross-examination of the
adversary's expert. If, on the other hand, the expert's role is lim-
ited to general testimony on economic principles, his responsibili-
ties should include suggesting what not to ask. In either situation,
an economic expert can help counsel develop and present graphic
exhibits portraying the salient characteristics of the industry, the
client's damages, or the proposed remedies. The expert's summary
diagrams or charts may alleviate the boredom of complex financial
transactions and enlighten the finder of fact about the significance
of otherwise confusing statistical relationships." These devices
provide supplements to the expert's testimony and improve the ef-
fectiveness of counsel's closing argument or, if in an administrative
hearing, the proposed findings of fact.
XI. THE (GENTLE) CONTROL OF AN EXPERT
Ordinarily, 1.0. economists do not think like lawyers about
law, facts, and the application of economic theory to law and facts.
Frederick M. Rowe).
48. Kingdon, The "Big Antitrust Case": Thoughts On Procedural Reform, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 25, 34 (1980). See also Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are the Problems? 67
A.B.A.J. 450 (1981).
49. One proposal requires counsel to narrow the scope of document production through
a requirement of greater specificity-Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Actions,
Rule 5(a): Document Production in Complex Civil Actions. See Kaminsky, Proposed Fed-
eral Disovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 971-72 (1980).
The economist can alleviate unnecessary harassing requests by counsel and eliminate dupli-
cation by narrowing the areas of economic inquiry. Id.
50. The use of demonstrative evidence to summarize voluminous or complicated data is
recommended in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (CCH) § 2.61
(1969).
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1.0. economics encompasses both the economists' ideological
framework from which they draw hypotheses, and the mathemati-
cal process for disproving hypotheses. Economists view their craft
as a method of scientific investigation because of this continued
scheme of testing-or modeling-used to refute or confirm
hypotheses.
Trial lawyers, however, are advocates trained to develop a
strong emotional current in the courtroom. A trial lawyer attempts
to build a case on evidence presented persuasively so that the trier
of fact will reach a logical and (the lawyer hopes) compelled con-
clusion. Law is a craft or an art, not a science.51
The strong emotional current that counsel must develop will
not occur if he relies on weighty econometric theory. Jurors trying
to understand the subtleties of demand substitutability will be
confused or bored by discussions of elasticity coefficients. To the
economist, however, quantitative data are significant. They sup-
port his hypothesis about the effect of an industry's structure or of
a firm's conduct. Theiefore, counsel must review the economist's
statistical evidence, decide what is important to support his legal
argument, and present it so that the jury can understand it. Unless
the expert has honed his forensic skills to the tolerance and under-
standing of a lay jury, counsel must insist on presenting the evi-
dence in his own way.
Moreover, counsel should question his expert's assumptions
about the proper form in which to present statistical data. For ex-
ample, if the economist tells counsel that certain data do not yield
as clear a result as other data, counsel need not present the second
set of data. Counsel must weigh the economist's advice-insuring
that the data presented are strong enough to allow the economist's
testimony to withstand cross-examination-against the need to
present a clear and compelling case.
Counsel should also be cautious about accepting the expert's
asserted need for data not embodied in typical industry sources or
widely circulated governmental reports. The economist might want
to use a Senate report, an FTC study, a report by the Counsel of
Wage and Price Stability, and two surveys based on documents
subpoenaed from third parties. Counsel should ask if the expert
51. The economist browsing through a trial lawyer's bookshelf will gain valuable in-
sights. See generally ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OP AMERICA, PSYCHOLOGY AND PERSUA-
SION IN ADVOCACY (1978) (reprints on persuasion in the courtroom, law and language, and
the presentation of evidence); C. CUSUMANO, LAUGH AT THE LAWYER WHO CROSS-EXAMINES
You! (1942); R. HARRIS, HINrs ON ADVOCACY (1881).
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really needs these reports to prove the case. Perhaps the expert is
proceeding with an overabundance of caution when the simple fac-
tual setting of the case requires none.
If the expert wants to create an exhibit showing the interrela-
tionship between several concepts that are important to the case,
he should select a chart from a widely accepted textbook. This
chart will probably be more persuasive than one created just for
the case. Once the economic expert transcends the realm of his sci-
ence to suggest how the lawyer should proceed with his art, counsel
should consider the advice but not feel bound to follow it. The
economist bases his view on a different expertise than that of
counsel.
Finally, control over an expert's involvement is a delicate is-
sue. Counsel must, on one hand, avoid the appearance of denying
information to the economist lest his adversary create an impres-
sion at trial that he put blinders on the expert, thereby causing a
biased opinion. On the other hand, without firm control, the case
will lack direction and lose cohesiveness.
The kind of control that counsel should assert over the ex-
pert's activity depends upon the working relationship between
counsel and the expert." If counsel and the expert develop rap-
port, mutual respect, and confidence in each other's abilities, there
should be no problem in exercising prerogatives. The member of
the trial team assigned to handle the expert should continuously
work with him. If lead counsel monitors their progress he can con-
trol a large case better, keep it within manageable proportions, and
succeed in making persuasive use of the substance and application
of economic theory, which has become increasingly important in
antitrust litigation.
52. See Jentes, supra note 16, at 1842-43.
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